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cognitively sophisticated moves as inferring the (hidden) causes of
our current observations, and using that hypothesis to predict
future observations, both as we passively monitor and actively
intervene in the world. It is theory laden and model-rich.
We have no trouble believing that a fundamental part of our
exquisite attunement to environmental contingencies involves
sensitivity to (and the ability to make use of) inter- and cross-
modal correlations in sensory signals. Sensitivity to temporal and
spatial (e.g., across the retina) correlations could underwrite
many functional advantages, including the ones Clark highlights,
such as reducing sensory bandwidth and drawing attention to
salient departures from expectations. In this sense we share
Clark’s belief that predictive1 coding is likely to be a ubiquitous
and fundamental principle of brain operation; neural nets are
especially good at computing correlations.
However, we don’t think that evidence for predictive1 coding
warrants a belief in predictive2 coding. And it is only from
predictive2 coding that many of Clark’s larger implications follow.
Clark makes the move from predictive1 coding to predictive2
coding largely by relying on an innovative account of binocular
rivalry offered by Hohwy et al. (2008). In Clark’s somewhat sim-
pliﬁed version of their proposal, the experienced alternation
between seeing the face stimulus presented to one eye and the
house stimulus presented to the other is explained by a knowl-
edge-driven alternation between rival hypotheses (face at location
x, house at location x) neither of which can account for all of the
observations. According to Clark, the reason the images don’t fuse
and lead to a visual steady-state is because we know that faces and
houses can’t coexist that way. If this knowledge-driven account is
the correct way to understand something as perceptually basic as
binocular rivalry, then predictive2 coding can begin to look like a
plausible, multilevel and unifying explanation of perception,
action and cognition: perception is cognitive and inferential; infer-
ence perceptual; and all of it is active.
But while the predictive2 coding model of binocular rivalry may
be consistent with much of the data, it is far from the only possible
explanation of the phenomenon. Here is an outline of a reasonable
predictive1 coding account: Given the generally high-level of
cross-correlation in the inputs of our two eyes, the left eye
signal would predict1 greater correlation with the right eye than
is currently in evidence; this would weaken the inputs associated
with the left eye, unmasking the inputs associated with the right
eye, which would predict1 cross-correlated left eye signals . . .
and so on. However far this particular proposal could be taken,
the point is one can account for the phenomenon with low-
level, knowledge-free, redundancy-reducing inhibitory inter-
actions between the eyes (see, e.g., Tong et al. 2006). After all,
binocular rivalry also occurs with orthogonal diffraction gratings,
indicating that high-level knowledge of what is visually possible
needn’t be the driver of the visual oscillation; humans don’t
have high-level knowledge about the inconsistency of orthogonal
gratings. In general, although not every pair of stimuli induce bis-
table perceptions, the distinction between those that do and those
that don’t appears to have little to do with knowledge (see Blake
[2001] for a review). Adopting a predictive2 coding account is a
theoretical choice not necessitated by the evidence. It is hardly
an inconsequential choice.
Using predictive2 coding as a GUT of brain function, as Clark
proposes, is problematic for several reasons. The ﬁrst problem is
with the very idea of a grand uniﬁed theory of brain function.
There is every reason to think that there can be no grand
uniﬁed theory of brain function because there is every reason to
think that an organ as complex as the brain functions according
to diverse principles. It is easy to imagine knowledge-rich
predictive2 coding processes employed in generating expectations
that we will confront a jar of mustard upon opening the refriger-
ator door, while knowledge-free predictive1 coding processes will
be used to alleviate the redundancy of sensory information. We
should be skeptical of any GUT of brain function. There is also
a problem more speciﬁc to predictive2 coding as a brain GUT.
Taking all of our experience and cognition to be the result of
high-level, knowledge-rich predictive2 coding makes it seem as
if the world that we experience and think about is a projection
of our minds. Western philosophy has been down this lonely
and unproductive road many times. It would be a shame if the
spotlight that Clark helpfully shines on this innovative work in
neuroscience were to lead us back there.
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Abstract: Clark advertises the predictive coding (PC) framework as
applying to a wide range of phenomena, including attention. We argue
that for many attentional phenomena, the predictive coding picture
either makes false predictions, or else it offers no distinctive explanation
of those phenomena, thereby reducing its explanatory power.
According to the predictive coding view, at every level of the
visual/cortical hierarchy, there are two kinds of units: error units
and representation units. Representations propagate downward
in the visual hierarchy whereas error signals propagate upward.
Error in this sense might be better called “discrepancy,” since it
is the discrepancy between what the visual system predicts (at a
given level) and what is represented at that level. Clark advertises
the predictive coding (PC) framework as applying to a wide range
of phenomena, including attention, which Clark says “is achieved
by altering the gain (the ‘volume,’ to use a common analogy) on
the error-units” (sect. 2.3, para. 6). We argue that for many atten-
tional phenomena, the predictive coding picture either makes
false predictions, or else it offers no distinctive explanation of
those phenomena, thereby reducing its explanatory power.
Consider a basic result in this area (Carrasco et al. 2004), which
is that attention increases perceived contrast by enhancing “the
representation of a stimulus in a manner akin to boosting its phys-
ical contrast” (Ling & Carrasco 2006, p. 1243). A cross-modal
study using auditory attention-attractors (Störmer et al. 2009)
showed that the contrast-boosting effect correlated with increased
activity in early stages of visual processing that are sensitive to
differences in contrast among stimuli. The larger the cortical
effect, the larger the effect on perceivers’ judgments. Increasing
the contrast of a stimulus has an effect on the magnitude of per-
ceptual adaptation to that stimulus, causing greater threshold acti-
vation in the tilt after-effect and longer recovery time. Ling and
Carrasco (2006) showed that attending to a stimulus while adapt-
ing to that stimulus has the same effect as increasing the contrast
of the adapting stimulus. After attending to the adaptor (70% con-
trast), the contrast sensitivity of all observers was equivalent to the
effect of adapting to a 81–84% contrast adaptor.
How do these results look from a PC perspective? Suppose that
at time t1, the perceiver is not attending to the left side of space
but nonetheless sees a striped grid on the left with apparent con-
trast of 70%. Because there is no movement or other change, at
time t2, the visual system predicts that the patch will continue at
70%. But at t2 the perceiver attends to the patch, raising the
apparent contrast to, say, 82%. Now at t2 there is an error, a dis-
crepancy between what is predicted and what is “observed.” Since
the PC view says attention is turning up the volume on the error
representations, it predicts that at t3 the signal (the represented
contrast) should rise even higher than 82%. But that does
not happen.
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There are two important lessons. First, the initial changes due
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to attending come before there is an error (at t2 in the example),
so the PC viewpoint cannot explain them. Second, the PC view
makes the false prediction that the changes due to attending
will be magniﬁed.
Sometimes PC theorists assume the error signal is equal to the
input. Perhaps this identiﬁcation makes some sense if the percei-
ver’s visual system has no “expectations,” say because the eyes
have just opened. But once the eyes have opened and things in
the environment are seen, it makes no sense to take the error
signal to be the sensory input.
The PC picture also seems to lack a distinctive explanation of
why attention increases spatial acuity. Yeshurun and Carrasco
(1998) showed that increased attention can be detrimental to per-
formance when resolution was already on the border of too high
for the scale of the texture, increasing acuity to the point where
the subject does not see the forest for the trees. Too little atten-
tion can also be detrimental, making it harder to see the trees. Yes-
hurun and Carrasco varied resolution of perception by presenting
textured squares (such as the one in Fig. 1) at different eccentri-
cities (the more foveal, the better the resolution). But they also
varied resolution by manipulating the focus of spatial attention:
With the eyes focused at the center, they attracted attention to
the left or to the right. Combining contributions to resolution
from eccentricity and attention, they found that there was an
optimal level of resolution for detecting the square, with detection
falling off on both ends. Single cell recordings in monkey visual
cortex reveal shrinking receptive ﬁelds (the area of space that a
neuron responds to) in mid-to-high level vision, speciﬁcally in
V4, MT, and LIP, and this shrinkage in receptive ﬁelds is a contri-
butor to explaining the increase in acuity (Carrasco 2011).
Does the PC framework have a distinctive explanation of atten-
tional effects on spatial acuity, in terms of “gain in error-units”? If,
due to the level of acuity, one does not see the square, then the
prediction of no square will be conﬁrmed, and there will be no dis-
crepancy (“error”) to be magniﬁed. Since the gain in error units is
the only distinctive resource of the PC view for explaining atten-
tional phenomena, the view seems to have no distinctive expla-
nation of this result either. Can the predictive coding point of
view simply borrow Carrasco’s explanation? That explanation is
a matter of shrinkage in receptive ﬁelds of neurons in the rep-
resentation nodes, not anything to do with prediction error, so
the predictive coding point of view would have to concede that
attention can act directly on representation nodes without a
detour through error nodes.
Finally, attention to certain items – for example, random dot
patterns –makes them appear larger. Anton-Erxleben et al.
(2007) showed that the size of the effect is inversely related to
the size of the stimulus, explaining the result in terms of receptive
ﬁeld shift (such shifts are also observed from single cell recordings
in monkey visual areas; Womelsdorf et al. 2006). This explanation
depends on the retinotopic and therefore roughly spatiotopic
organization common to many visual areas – not on error units.
Neurons whose receptive ﬁelds lie on the periphery of the
pattern shift their receptive ﬁelds so as to include the pattern,
moving the portion of the spatiotopically represented space to
include the pattern, resulting in the representation of the
pattern as occupying a larger area. Here too, predictive coding
offers no distinctive explanation.
The facts of attention and adaptation do not ﬁt well with the
predictive coding view or any picture based on how “sensory
neurons should behave” (Lochmann et al. 2012) rather than the
facts of how they do behave. Without a distinctive explanation
of these facts, the explanatory promises of predictive coding are
overdrawn.
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Abstract: A cornerstone of the target article is that, in a predictive coding
framework, attention can be modelled by weighting prediction error with a
measure of precision. We argue that this is not a complete explanation,
especially in the light of ERP (event-related potentials) data showing
large evoked responses for frequently presented target stimuli, which
thus are predicted.
The target article by Andy Clark champions predictive coding as a
theory of brain function. Perception is the domain in which many
of the strongest claims for predictive coding have been made, and
we focus on that faculty. It is important to note that there are
other unifying explanations of perception, one being that the
brain is a salience detector, with salience referring broadly to rel-
evance to an organism’s goals. These goals reﬂect a short-term
task set (e.g., searching a crowd for a friend’s face), or more
ingrained, perhaps innate motivations (e.g., avoiding physical
threat). A prominent perspective is, exactly, that one role of atten-
tion is to locate and direct perception towards, salient stimuli.
The target article emphasises the importance of evoked
responses, particularly EEG event-related potentials (ERPs), in
adjudicating between theories of perception. The core idea is
that the larger the difference between an incoming stimulus and
the prediction, the larger the prediction error and thus the
larger the evoked response. There are indeed ERPs that are
clearly modulated by prediction error, for example, the Mismatch
Figure 1 (Block & Siegel). A display of one of the textured ﬁgures (the square on the right) used by Yeshurun and Carrasco (1998). The
square appeared at varying degrees of eccentricity. With low resolution in peripheral locations, attention improved detection of the
square; but with high resolution in central locations, attention impaired detection.
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